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CODIFY THIS: EXCULPATORY CONTRACTS 
IN WISCONSIN RECREATIONAL 
BUSINESSES 
It is common practice for recreational businesses, such as ski resorts or 
fitness centers, to require their customers to sign a release of liability form.  
The purpose of this release form is to relieve the business from any potential 
liability in the event a customer suffers an injury.  However, since 1982, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court has yet to uphold an exculpatory contract.  Rather 
than attempting to lay out principles and guidelines for how to draft an 
exculpatory agreement—in hopes that it will be ruled enforceable—this 
Comment proposes that Wisconsin recreational businesses, like ski resorts or 
gyms, should not require customers to sign a release of liability form. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
When consumers decide to hit the slopes or sign up for that new gym 
membership when the New Year hits, more often than not, they are required to 
sign a release of liability form.  A release form, i.e., exculpatory contract, is a 
“contract in which one party agrees to release . . . another from potential tort 
liability for future conduct covered in the agreement.”1  Businesses will rely on 
these release forms in order to limit their exposure to lawsuits.2  The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court defines exculpatory contracts as “contracts which relieve a 
party from liability for harm caused by his or her own negligence.”3  Examining 
the cases heard before the Wisconsin Supreme Court regarding exculpatory 
contracts, the following three main principles have been cited when 
determining the validity of exculpatory contracts: (1) “[exculpatory] contracts 
are not favored by the law”;4 (2) an exculpatory clause must “be construed 
strictly against the party seeking to rely on [it]”;5 and (3) courts will “examine 
the facts and circumstances of each exculpatory contract with special care to 
determine whether enforcement of the exculpatory contract in the individual 
case contravenes public policy.”6  These three principles represent the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court’s attempt to balance both principles of contract and 
tort law.7 
 
1. Mary Ann Connell & Frederick G. Savage, Releases: Is There Still a Place for Their Use by 
Colleges and Universities?, 29 J.C. & U.L. 579, 580 (2003). 
2. Keith Bruett, Can Wisconsin Businesses Safely Rely upon Exculpatory Contracts to Limit 
Their Liability?, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 1081, 1081 (1998). 
3. Merten v. Nathan, 108 Wis. 2d 205, 210, 321 N.W.2d 173, 176 (1982). 
4. Id. at 210–11; Yauger v. Skiing Enters., Inc., 206 Wis. 2d 76, 81, 557 N.W.2d 60, 62 (1996); 
Richards v. Richards, 181 Wis. 2d 1007, 1015, 513 N.W.2d 118, 121 (1994); accord Roberts v. T.H.E. 
Ins. Co., 2016 WI 20, ¶ 48, 367 Wis. 2d 386, 879 N.W.2d 492; Atkins v. Swimwest Family Fitness 
Ctr., 2005 WI 4, ¶ 12, 277 Wis. 2d 303, 691 N.W.2d 334; Dobratz v. Thomson, 161 Wis. 2d 502, 514, 
468 N.W.2d 654, 658 (1991); Disc. Fabric House of Racine, Inc. v. Wis. Tel. Co., 117 Wis. 2d 587, 
600, 345 N.W.2d 417, 423 (1984) (quoting Pride v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 138 S.E.2d 155, 157 (S.C. 
1964)); Arnold v. Shawano Cty. Agric. Socʹy, 111 Wis. 2d 203, 209, 330 N.W.2d 773, 777 (1983), 
overruled on other grounds by Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 401 N.W.2d 816 
(1987).  The rationale behind why exculpatory contracts are not favored by the law is “because 
exculpatory contracts tend to allow conduct . . . below the acceptable standard of ordinary and 
reasonable care.”  Dobratz, 161 Wis. 2d at 514. 
5. Merten, 108 Wis. 2d at 211; accord Roberts, 2016 WI 20, ¶ 48; Atkins, 2005 WI 4, ¶ 12; 
Richards, 181 Wis. 2d at 1015; Disc. Fabric House of Racine, 117 Wis. 2d at 600; Arnold, 111 Wis. 
2d at 209.  
6. Merten, 108 Wis. 2d at 211. 
7. Id. at 212; Atkins, 2005 WI 4, ¶ 14; Richards, 181 Wis. 2d at 1016; Dobratz, 161 Wis. 2d at 
514–15. 
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Despite the fact that courts attempt to strike a balance between principles 
of contract law and tort law,8 the Wisconsin Supreme Court, since 1982, has 
considered the validity of an exculpatory contract in a total of eight cases, and 
has—in all eight cases—held each exculpatory contract unenforceable.9  And 
while the holdings have been consistent, the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s 
analysis regarding the enforceability of exculpatory contracts has evolved.10  
This makes it extremely difficult for businesses to prevail and convince the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court (or any circuit court under it for that matter) to find 
the exculpatory contract enforceable.   
Given the uphill battle in attempting to convince the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court to uphold an exculpatory contract, this Comment argues that Wisconsin 
recreational businesses should not require their customers to sign a release of 
liability form because: (a) Wisconsin case law does not favor exculpatory 
contracts; and (b) various Wisconsin statutes offer immunity/protection to those 
who fulfill their duties under the applicable statute. 
This Comment proceeds as follows.  Part II examines the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court’s analysis of exculpatory contracts under both contract law and 
public policy grounds.  I also establish a timeline mapping out exactly how the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court’s analysis has evolved.  In Part III, I discuss Roberts 
v. T.H.E. Insurance Company, a case recently decided by the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court.11  Additionally, I analyze the exculpatory language found in a 
gym membership agreement located in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and apply the 
analysis the Wisconsin Supreme Court undertook in Roberts.  Specifically, I 
demonstrate just how difficult it is for businesses to prevail when relying on an 
exculpatory contract, given the current analysis undertaken by the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court.  I then assess whether or not a court would find the exculpatory 
language enforceable.  Part IV examines a specific Wisconsin statute that 
affords ski resorts protection, and thus, eliminates a need for customers to sign 
a release of liability form.  I also briefly return to Roberts v. T.H.E. Insurance 
Company, which supports the notion that an exculpatory contract is not needed 
 
8. See Atkins, 2005 WI 4, ¶ 14; Richards, 181 Wis. 2d at 1016; Dobratz, 161 Wis. 2d at 514–15; 
Merten, 108 Wis. 2d at 212. 
9. See Alexander T. Pendleton, Enforceable Exculpatory Agreements: Do They Still Exist?, WIS. 
LAW., Aug. 2005, at 17; see also Roberts, 2016 WI 20, ¶ 4; Atkins, 2005 WI 4, ¶ 2; Yauger, 206 Wis. 
2d at 89; Richards, 181 Wis. 2d at 1020; Dobratz, 161 Wis. 2d at 526; Disc. Fabric House of Racine, 
117 Wis. 2d at 604; Arnold, 111 Wis. 2d at 214; Merten, 108 Wis. 2d at 215. 
10. See Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 86 (recognizing that earlier cases had resolved the issue based on 
contract but determined that public policy is actually the “germane analysis”); Atkins, 2005 WI 4, ¶ 13 
(confirming that public policy is the “germane analysis”). 
11. 2016 WI 20. 
NOLD - MULR VOL. 101, NO. 2 (FINAL 2.7.18).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/24/18  1:08 PM 
576 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [101:573 
when a business is afforded statutory protection.12  Finally, Part V sets forth a 
proposal that would eliminate the need for recreational businesses in Wisconsin 
to require their customers to sign a release of liability form.   
II. TIMELINE OF THE WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT’S ANALYSIS OF 
EXCULPATORY CONTRACTS 
In this Part, I examine the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s analysis of 
exculpatory contracts under both contract law and public policy grounds, while 
establishing a timeline that lays out exactly how the court’s analysis has 
evolved.  Historically, exculpatory contracts have been analyzed under both 
principles of contract law and public policy grounds.13  However, recent cases 
decided by the Wisconsin Supreme Court have not emphasized the contractual 
analysis and have claimed that public policy is the germane analysis.14  
Nonetheless, the court will still conduct its analysis under principles of contract 
law if needed.15 
A. Historical Approach: Exculpatory Contracts Analyzed Under 
Principles of  Contract Law and Public Policy (1965–1994) 
From 1965 to 1994, the Wisconsin Supreme Court analyzed exculpatory 
contracts under both a contractual basis and public policy.16  However, the 
analysis undertaken using principles of contract law versus the analysis 
undertaken using public policy is distinguishable.17  In order to differentiate 
between the two, it is helpful to examine exculpatory contracts resolved under 
either (i) principles of contract law or (ii) public policy. 
1.  Exculpatory Contracts Resolved under Principles of Contract Law 
When an exculpatory contract is enforceable under public policy grounds, 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court will “look to the contract itself to consider its 
 
12. See id. ¶ 47. 
13. See Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 86. 
14. Id.; Roberts, 2016 WI 20, ¶ 49. 
15. See Roberts, 2016 WI 20, ¶ 50; Arnold v. Shawano Cty. Agric. Socʹy, 111 Wis. 2d 203, 211, 
330 N.W.2d 773, 777 (1983), overruled on other grounds by Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 
2d 304, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987). 
16. See Richards v. Richards, 181 Wis. 2d 1007, 1011, 513 N.W.2d 118, 119 (1994); Dobratz v. 
Thomson, 161 Wis. 2d 502, 506–07, 468 N.W.2d 654, 655 (1991); Disc. Fabric House of Racine, Inc. 
v. Wis. Tel. Co., 117 Wis. 2d 587, 600, 345 N.W.2d 417, 423 (1984); Arnold, 111 Wis. 2d at 210–11; 
Merten v. Nathan, 108 Wis. 2d 205, 206, 321 N.W.2d 173, 174 (1982). 
17. See Merten, 108 Wis. 2d at 214–15. 
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validity” under contract principles.18  The court will examine the facts and 
circumstances of each case to determine whether the contract expresses the 
intent of the parties.19  If in fact the contract fails to express the intent of the 
parties, the court will not enforce the exculpatory agreement.20  Perhaps even 
more significant, the Wisconsin Supreme Court disfavors any exculpatory 
agreement that is broad and general in terms and will only bar “claims that are 
within the contemplation of the parties when the contract was executed.”21  In 
order to shed some light on these principles, the following paragraphs illustrate 
the two leading exculpatory contract cases analyzed under principles of contract 
law decided by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. 
In Arnold v. Shawano County Agricultural Society, racecar driver Leroy 
Arnold and his wife, Karen Arnold, sued Shawano County Agricultural Society, 
Shawano County, and the Shawano County Fair Board (track owners and race 
promoters), seeking to recover damages for the severe brain damage and 
personal injuries that Mr. Arnold sustained as a result of the accident.22  The 
defendants moved for summary judgment, pointing to an exculpatory contract 
signed by Mr. Arnold.23  In its analysis, the Wisconsin Supreme Court first 
looked to public policy.24  After determining the exculpatory contract was not 
invalid under public policy grounds, the court then looked to the contract itself 
to determine its validity.25   
Looking at the facts and circumstances of the agreement in order to 
determine whether the exculpatory contract expressed the intent of the parties,26 
the court stated, “[t]he determination of intent of the parties to a release, and 
 
18. Dobratz, 161 Wis. 2d at 520 (quoting Arnold, 111 Wis. 2d at 211).  Dobratz paved the way 
in terms of exculpatory agreements being analyzed under principles of contract.  See, e.g., Richards, 
181 Wis. 2d at 1014.  
19. Arnold, 111 Wis. 2d at 211; Dobratz, 161 Wis. 2d at 520. 
20. Arnold, 111 Wis. 2d at 211.  The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Dobratz framed the issue in 
the following manner: “[T]his court must determine whether the claim being made by the plaintiff was 
clearly within the contemplation of the parties when the contract was executed.  Only if it is apparent 
that the parties . . . knowingly agreed to excuse the defendants from liability will the contract be 
enforceable.”  Dobratz, 161 Wis. 2d at 520 (citation omitted). 
21. Arnold, 111 Wis. 2d at 211 (citations omitted); accord Dobratz, 161 Wis. 2d at 520.  In 
Dobratz, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reiterated the fact that “the court will closely scrutinize an 
exculpatory contract and construe it strictly against the defendants.”  Id. 
22. Arnold, 111 Wis. 2d at 204–05. 
23. Id. at 206–07. 
24. See id. at 210–11. 
25. Id. at 211 (examining two cases that resolved an exculpatory contract issue under public 
policy before moving on to contract law). 
26. Id. 
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the scope of a release, is a question of fact for the jury.”27  Looking at Karen 
Arnold’s affidavit, the court noted that Mrs. Arnold in fact alleged not that her 
husband’s injuries were caused by the accident, but rather by the spraying of 
toxic chemicals during the rescue mission.28  Examining the contract itself, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court found that “an issue of material fact exists as to 
whether the risk of negligent rescue operations was within the contemplation 
of the parties at the time the exculpatory contract was executed,” and therefore 
appropriate for the trier of fact to decide.29  Specifically, the exculpatory 
contract stated that it covered “any loss, liability or damages whether caused by 
the negligence of releasees or otherwise.”30  As a result, the court concluded 
that, even though an attempt was made to construct an all-inclusive contract, 
the exculpatory contract was ambiguous.31  Thus, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
affirmed the court of appeals, holding that the exculpatory contract did not bar 
the claims.32 
Eight years later, the Wisconsin Supreme Court examined and resolved 
another exculpatory contract under principles of contract law.33  In Dobratz v. 
Thomson, Mark Dobratz, a member of a water ski show, was struck and killed 
by a boat during one of the shows.34  Brenda Dobratz, Mark Dobratz’s widow, 
filed negligence claims against club officers, various members who participated 
in the show, and the driver of the boat that struck him.35  The defendants moved 
for summary judgment, claiming the exculpatory contract signed by Mark 
Dobratz barred the claims.36  Brenda Dobratz argued that the terms of the 
contract were unclear and ambiguous such that the exculpatory contract should 
be rendered unenforceable as a matter of law.37 
Following the blueprint in Arnold, the Wisconsin Supreme Court first 
looked to public policy.38  The court here found that the contract was not void 
 
27. Id. at 212. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. (footnote omitted). 
31. Id. at 214. 
32. See id. at 215. 
33. See Dobratz v. Thomson, 161 Wis. 2d 502, 468 N.W.2d 654 (1991). 
34. Id. at 507–08. 
35. Id. at 508.  Neither the club nor the insurance carrier was named in the suit because it did not 
carry any applicable insurance; however, the individual defendants’ insurers were joined as parties.  
Id.   
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 520. 
38. Id. at 515. 
NOLD - MULR VOL. 101, NO. 2 (FINAL 2.7.18).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/24/18  1:08 PM 
2017] CODIFY THIS 579 
on public policy grounds, and therefore looked to the contract itself.39  Similar 
to Arnold, the court held that provisions of the contract at issue here were broad 
and general.40  The Wisconsin Supreme Court reasoned that, “[l]ike the contract 
in Arnold, this contract did not ‘set out any particular conditions concerning the 
nature of [the activity] and the [location] where it [was] to take place.’”41  More 
specifically, the exculpatory contract did not specify the kind of stunts Mr. 
Dobratz would perform, what level of difficulty or danger might be associated 
with the stunts, and no information regarding these concerns was provided to 
Mr. Dobratz prior to signing.42   
However, distinguishable from Arnold, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held 
that, as a matter of law, an exculpatory contract never existed.43  As a result, 
unlike Arnold, the trier of fact did not need to determine whether an exculpatory 
contract existed in the first place.44  Additionally, in an attempt to offer guidance 
when drafting exculpatory contracts, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated:  
[A]lthough we do not intend to create a “magic words” rule, 
we consider that it would be very helpful for such contracts to 
set forth in clear and express terms that the party signing it is 
releasing others for their negligent acts or, where the contract 
includes an assumption of risk clause, is assuming the risk of 
harm caused by the negligent acts of others.45 
While some may have taken this advice when drafting exculpatory contracts, it 
will become evident that heeding this advice is by no means a sure thing.  
2.  Exculpatory Contracts Resolved under Public Policy   
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin recognizes that public policy is not an 
easily-defined concept.46  The concept “embodies the community common 
 
39. Id. at 519–20.  The court here stated, “In Arnold, we indicated that where an exculpatory 
contract is not void and unenforceable on public policy grounds[] [w]e . . . must look to the contract 
itself.”  Id. at 520 (quoting Arnold v. Shawano Cty. Agric. Socʹy, 111 Wis. 2d 203, 211, 330 N.W.2d 
773, 777 (1983), overruled on other grounds by Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 401 
N.W.2d 816 (1987)). 
40. Id. at 522. 
41. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Arnold, 111 Wis. 2d at 211). 
42. Dobratz, 161 Wis. 2d at 522. 
43. Id. at 523. 
44. See id.  Therefore, unlike Arnold, it was not necessary “for the trial court to determine 
whether in fact there existed an exculpatory contract even though [the court] could not find an 
enforceable exculpatory contract as a matter of law.”  Id. 
45. Id. at 525. 
46. Merten v. Nathan, 108 Wis. 2d 205, 213, 321 N.W.2d 173, 178 (1982). 
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sense and common conscience.”47  In order to determine whether an 
exculpatory contract violates public policy, the court must look at the facts and 
circumstances of each case.48  In determining the validity of an exculpatory 
contract under public policy, the Wisconsin Supreme Court attempts to balance 
“the tension between principles of contract law and tort law inherent in any 
exculpatory contract.”49 
Principles of contract law justify exculpatory contracts.50  The law of 
contract is based on the key fundamental principle of freedom of contract and 
that individuals should have the opportunity to “govern their own affairs 
without governmental interference.”51  Moreover, “[f]reedom of contract 
requires that [individuals who] engage in the bargaining process [do so] ‘freely 
and voluntarily.’”52  Each party is then protected by the courts, which ensure 
that the promises will be performed.53  One scholar has pointed to the 
importance of freedom of contract by citing the United States Supreme Court, 
which stated: 
If there is one thing which more than another public policy 
requires it is that men of full age and competent understanding 
shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their 
contracts, when entered into freely and voluntarily, shall be 
held sacred, and shall be enforced by courts of justice.54 
On the other hand, principles of tort law discourage the enforceability of 
exculpatory contracts.55  “The law of torts is directed toward compensation of 
individuals for injuries sustained as the result of the unreasonable conduct of 
another.”56  Additionally, tort law “serves the ‘prophylactic’ purpose of 
 
47. Id. 
48. Dobratz, 161 Wis. 2d at 514. 
49. Id. at 515; accord Bruett, supra note 2, at 1083 (“Courts assessing the validity of exculpatory 
clauses attempt to balance ‘the tension between the principles of contract and tort law that are inherent 
in such [] agreement[s].’” (alterations in original) (quoting Richards v. Richards, 181 Wis. 2d 1007, 
1016, 513 N.W.2d 118, 121 (1994))). 
50. See Bruett, supra note 2, at 1083. 
51. Merten, 108 Wis. 2d at 211. 
52. Bruett, supra note 2, at 1083 (quoting Richards, 181 Wis. 2d at 1016).  
53. Merten, 108 Wis. 2d at 211. 
54. Bruett, supra note 2, at 1083 (quoting Baltimore & Ohio S.W. R.R. Co. v. Voigt, 176 U.S. 
498, 505 (1900)). 
55. Id. at 1084. 
56. Merten, 108 Wis. 2d at 211. 
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preventing future harm.”57  Furthermore, payment of damages functions as an 
incentive to act in accordance with a reasonable standard of care.58 
Balancing the principles of contract and tort law, courts will find that an 
exculpatory contract violates public policy when “the public policy ‘of 
imposing liability on persons whose conduct creates an unreasonable risk of 
harm’ outweighs the public policy of ‘freedom of contract.’”59  However, as 
noted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in one of its earliest cases regarding 
exculpatory contracts, the balancing is nothing short of a challenge.  The court 
stated: 
Adherence to principles of contract law would generally 
lead a court to enforce an exculpatory agreement without 
passing on the substance of the agreement.  Adherence to 
principles of tort law would tend to make a court reluctant to 
allow parties to shift by contract the burden of negligent 
conduct from the actor to the victim who has no actual control 
or responsibility for the conduct causing the injury.  The rules 
governing exculpatory contracts reflect the uneasy balance 
between these principles of contract and tort law.60   
Nevertheless, Wisconsin’s adoption of section 195 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts somewhat eliminated this difficulty in balancing.61  
According to section 195 of the Restatement—concerning contractual terms 
exempting liability for harm caused intentionally, recklessly, or negligently—
exculpatory contracts can be found unenforceable on grounds of public policy; 
section 195 states: 
(1) A term exempting a party from tort liability for harm caused 
intentionally or recklessly is unenforceable on grounds of 
public policy. 
(2) A term exempting a party from tort liability for harm caused 
negligently is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if 
(a) the term exempts an employer from liability to an 
employee for injury in the course of his employment; 
(b) the term exempts one charged with a duty of public 
service from liability to one to whom that duty is owed for 
compensation for breach of that duty, or 
 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 211–12; Bruett, supra note 2, at 1084. 
59. Richards v. Richards, 181 Wis. 2d 1007, 1016, 513 N.W.2d 118, 122 (1994) (quoting Merten, 
108 Wis. 2d. at 215). 
60. Merten, 108 Wis. 2d at 212 (footnote omitted). 
61. See id. 
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(c) the other party is similarly a member of a class protected 
against the class to which the first party belongs. 
(3) A term exempting a seller of a product from his special tort 
liability for physical harm  to a user or consumer is 
unenforceable on grounds of public policy unless the term is 
fairly bargained for and is consistent with the policy underlying 
that liability.62 
Additionally, Comment a of section 195 of the Restatement provides the 
court with an out.63  The Wisconsin Supreme Court has noted that these 
categories “are not intended as an exhaustive list of situations in which 
exculpatory contracts are unenforceable on the grounds of public policy.”64  As 
a result, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has the ability to craft its own rules and 
factors for each case.65  To clarify the public policy analysis just explained, and 
to demonstrate the court’s broad discretion, it may be helpful to illustrate a case 
decided by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.   
In Richards v. Richards, Leo Richards, an “over-the-road truck driver” for 
Monkem Company, and his wife, Jerilyn Richards, discussed the possibility of 
her riding along as a passenger with him.66  However, before Mrs. Richards 
could ride as a passenger, Monkem Company required her to sign a “Passenger 
Authorization” form.67  The form not only served as the Company’s 
authorization form for passengers to ride in a company truck, but it also served 
as the passenger’s release of all claims against Monkem.68  While 
accompanying her husband on one of his scheduled trips, the truck overturned, 
injuring Mrs. Richards.69  The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the 
exculpatory language in Monkem’s Passenger Authorization form violated 
public policy, and thus, was unenforceable.70  In reaching this conclusion, the 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin looked at a combination of three factors.71 
 
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
63. See id. § 195 cmt. a.   
64. Merten, 108 Wis. 2d at 213; see Dobratz v. Thomson, 161 Wis. 2d 502, 516, 468 N.W.2d 
654, 659 (1991). 
65. Bruett, supra note 2, at 1086; see, e.g., Richards v. Richards, 181 Wis. 2d 1007, 1016, 513 
N.W.2d 118, 122 (1994) (applying three different factors). 
66. Richards, 181 Wis. 2d at 1011–12. 
67. Id. at 1012. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 1014. 
70. Id. at 1020. 
71. Id. at 1016. 
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First, the court looked at the fact that the Passenger Authorization form 
served a dual function and was not clearly identified.72  The court noted that, in 
order to avoid confusion, the release form should have been clearly labeled and 
distinguishable from the ride along form.73  Second, the release Mrs. Richards 
signed was broad and all-inclusive.74  Courts have held that “[a]n exculpatory 
agreement will be held to contravene public policy if it is so broad ‘that it would 
absolve [the defendant] from any injury to the [plaintiff] for any reason.’”75  In 
this case, the release excused “intentional, reckless, and negligent conduct” by 
the Company, another entity, and all “affiliated, associated, or subsidiary 
companies, partnerships, individuals, or corporations, and all other persons, 
firms or corporations.”76  Additionally, the release was not limited to a specified 
vehicle or for a specific period of time.77  Third, the contract was a standardized 
agreement, which offered Mrs. Richards zero opportunity to negotiate or 
bargain.78  The court reasoned that, “[h]ad [Mrs. Richards] been afforded the 
opportunity to negotiate a release, she might have declined to release the 
Company from liability.”79   
Finally, the court balanced principles of contract law and tort law.80  The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that the combination of the three factors 
demonstrated “that adherence to the principle of freedom of contract is not 
heavily favored,” and thus, the principle of tort law prevailed.81  As a result, the 
court held that the contract violated public policy, and was therefore 
unenforceable.82 
 
72. Id. at 1017.  The form served as an authorization form for a passenger to ride along and as a 
general release of liability form.  Id. 
73. Id. 
74. See id.  “The very breadth of the release raises questions about its meaning and demonstrates 
its one-sidedness; it is unreasonably favorable to the Company, the drafter of the contract.”  Id. at 1018. 
75. Id. at 1015 (alterations in original) (quoting Coll. Mobile Home Park & Sales, Inc. v. 
Hoffmann, 72 Wis. 2d 514, 521–22, 241 N.W.2d 174, 178 (1976)). 
76. Id. at 1017–18. 
77. Id. at 1018. 
78. See id. at 1019 (reasoning that while the release was “printed in a standardized form,” this 
alone did not invalidate the release; rather, Mrs. Richard’s lack of opportunity to bargain on top of the 
breadth of the release lead to its invalidation). 
79. Id. at 1020. 
80. See id. 
81. See id. 
82. Id. 
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B. Germane Analysis: A Shift to Public Policy (1996–2017) 
Two years after Richards was decided, the Wisconsin Supreme Court took 
up yet another exculpatory contracts case: Yauger v. Skiing Enterprises, Inc.83  
In this case, Michael Yauger purchased a family ski pass.84  On the application 
form, Yauger filled in the names of his daughters and wife.85  Immediately 
below this information, the application contained the following exculpatory 
clause at issue: “There are certain inherent risks in skiing and that we agree to 
hold Hidden Valley Ski Area/Skiing Enterprises Inc. harmless on account of 
any injury incurred by me or my [f]amily member on the Hidden Valley Ski 
Area premises.”86  Later that ski season, Tara, one of Yauger’s daughters, was 
skiing at Hidden Valley when she ran into a concrete base of a chair lift.87  The 
Yaugers filed a negligence suit, claiming Hidden Valley failed to pad the 
concrete base.88  After both the trial court and court of appeals held that the 
exculpatory clause barred the Yaugers’ negligence claim, the case made its way 
to the Wisconsin Supreme Court.89   
In this landmark case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted its new 
analysis regarding exculpatory contracts.90  The court recognized exculpatory 
contracts were being resolved under both contract law and public policy91: 
“Although we recognize that Dobratz and Arnold resolved the issue on a 
contractual basis, Richards reached the same result, yet departed from the 
contractual analysis and rested on public policy.  We conclude that public 
policy is the germane analysis.”92 
Distinguishable from Richards, here the court looked at two factors to 
support its holding that the exculpatory contract violated public policy: “First, 
the waiver must clearly, unambiguously, and unmistakably inform the signer of 
what is being waived.  Second, the form, looked at in its entirety, must alert the 
 
83. 206 Wis. 2d 76, 557 N.W.2d 60 (1996). 
84. Id. at 79. 
85. Id. 
86. Id.  This was the first paragraph out of five.  The waiver paragraphs “did not stand out from 
the rest of the form,” nor did they “require a separate signature.”  Id. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 79–80. 
90. See id. at 84–89. 
91. See id. at 81–84. 
92. Id. at 86 (emphasis added).  “In other words, the notion of ‘freedom of contract’ has been 
‘de-emphasized’ in favor of other considerations.”  Richard Schuster, Do Liability Waivers Really 
Work?, MATTHIESEN, WICKERT & LEHRER, S.C.: BLOG (Sept. 30, 2013), https://www.mwl-
law.com/do-liability-waivers-really-work/ [https://perma.cc/BZ87-PMYR]. 
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signer to the nature and significance of what is being signed.”93  The court held 
that the waiver failed both factors, and as a result, the waiver was ruled void as 
against public policy.94 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision to adopt public policy as the 
germane analysis95 is the court’s attempt to rectify a messy situation in the 
world of exculpatory contracts.  Years later, in 2005, the court confirmed that 
public policy is the germane analysis in Atkins v. Swimwest Family Fitness 
Center.96   
In Atkins, a local physician, Wilson, visited Swimwest for physical 
therapy.97  Before entering the facility, Wilson was required to fill out a guest 
registration card which contained a “Waiver Release Statement.”98  Without 
asking any questions, Wilson signed the card and entered the pool area.99  Soon 
thereafter, an employee saw Wilson lying motionless at the bottom of the 
pool.100  A Swimwest employee pulled Wilson from the pool and began 
administering CPR.101  Wilson died at the hospital the next day.102  The autopsy 
indicated the cause of death was drowning.103  Wilson’s only child, Benjamin 
Atkins, filed suit for wrongful death.104  In order to clarify Wisconsin’s law 
regarding the enforceability of exculpatory contracts, the court of appeals 
certified the appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court.105 
First, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin undertook a “contractual inquiry” to 
determine whether the language of the contract covered the activity.106  Because 
the language in the contract did cover the activity, the court proceeded to a 
 
93. Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 84. 
94. See id. at 89.  First, the waiver failed to clearly inform the signer that he was waiving all 
claims because the form was absent any language that would indicate “Yauger’s intent to release 
Hidden Valley from its own negligence.”  Id. at 84.  Second, the form failed to communicate the 
significance of the form being signed because (a) the form served two purposes; (b) the waiver section 
did not stick out; and (c) the waiver section did not require its own signature.  Id. at 79, 87. 
95. Id. at 86. 
96. 2005 WI 4, ¶ 13, 277 Wis. 2d 303, 691 N.W.2d 334. 
97. Id. ¶ 3. 
98. Id. ¶¶ 3–4. 
99. Id. ¶ 5. 




104. Id. ¶ 8. 
105. Id. ¶ 10.  Initially, the circuit court held that the form Wilson signed was enforceable, and 
thus, protected Swimwest from any liability for Wilson’s death.  Id. ¶ 9. 
106. See id. ¶ 13. 
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public policy analysis, and confirmed that such analysis “remains the ‘germane 
analysis’ for exculpatory clauses.”107  However, rather than resolving the 
conflicting approaches in Yauger and Richards,108 the court applied factors 
from both cases, and held that the exculpatory contract violated public policy.109  
The court concluded that: (1) the waiver of liability form was overly broad and 
all-inclusive (Richards and Yauger);110 (2) the form served two purposes—
guest registration and waiver of liability (Richards);111 and (3) Wilson did not 
have an opportunity to bargain (Richards).112  As a result, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court once again held that the exculpatory language was contrary to 
public policy, and thus, unenforceable.113   
III. THE CONSISTENT HOLDING: “VOID AS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY”   
Fast forward to March 2016.  In Roberts v. T.H.E. Insurance Company, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court decided its most recent case regarding the 
enforceability of exculpatory contracts.114  In this Part, I examine Roberts in 
order to illustrate the most recent analysis undertaken by the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court when resolving the enforceability of exculpatory contracts.  I 
then analyze the exculpatory language found in a gym membership contract 
located in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.  Applying the analysis the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court undertook in Roberts, I determine whether or not the court 
 
107. See id. 
108. One scholar has stated that “[t]he majority sidestepped resolving the conflicting approaches 
in those two cases” because, under either approach, the contract would violate public policy.  
Pendleton, supra note 9, at 18. 
109. Atkins, 2005 WI 4, ¶ 18 (“Applying the factors from Yauger and Richards, we hold that 
Swimwest’s exculpatory clause is in violation of public policy.”). 
110. Id. ¶ 18–19 (“The language chosen by Swimwest [was] not clear and could potentially bar 
any claim arising under any scenario.”); see also Yauger v. Skiing Enters., Inc., 206 Wis. 2d 76, 84, 
557 N.W.2d 60, 63 (1996); Richards v. Richards, 181 Wis. 2d 1007, 1017, 513 N.W.2d 118, 122 
(1994). 
111. Atkins, 2005 WI 4, ¶ 23 (“Just as in Richards and Yauger, the exculpatory language 
appeared to be part of, or a requirement for, a larger registration form.”); see also Richards, 181 Wis. 
2d at 1017. 
112. Atkins, 2005 WI 4, ¶ 18.  While a Swimwest employee did inform Mrs. Wilson that the 
form included a waiver, in addition to Mrs. Wilson being given an opportunity to read the form and 
ask questions, “[t]his information alone . . . is not sufficient to demonstrate a bargaining opportunity.  
The form itself must provide an opportunity to bargain.”  Id. ¶ 25; see also Richards, 181 Wis. 2d at 
1019. 
113. Atkins, 2005 WI 4, ¶ 30. 
114. See Roberts v. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 2016 WI 20, 367 Wis. 2d 386, 879 N.W.2d 492. 
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would find the exculpatory language in the gym membership contract 
enforceable. 
A. Roberts v. T.H.E. Insurance Company 
In Roberts, Patti Roberts was injured at a charity event when she was struck 
by a hot air balloon while waiting in line for a balloon ride.115  The hot air 
balloon was tied to a pick-up truck and two trees.116  The balloon-ride operator 
would raise the balloon to the length of the ropes and then lower it back down.117  
After Patti and her family got in line for a balloon ride, Sundog Ballooning 
(owner and operator of the hot air balloon) gave her a waiver of liability form.118  
While Roberts did in fact sign the release form, she did not return it to 
Sundog.119  Due to heavy winds, a rope tied to the hot air balloon snapped, 
causing the balloon to veer towards the customers waiting in line.120  As a result, 
Patti Roberts sustained injuries when she was struck by the hot air balloon’s 
basket and knocked to the ground.121   
Roberts filed suit against Sundog claiming that the balloon operator’s 
negligence caused her injuries.122  Sundog argued, “Roberts read the release, 
understood its importance, and understood she was waiving her right to bring a 
negligence claim.”123  Additionally, Sundog maintained that Patti Roberts failed 
to ask questions and had the opportunity to bargain.124  In the end, the court held 
that the liability waiver form was void as against public policy, and thus, 
unenforceable.125   
 
115. Id. ¶¶ 5–10. 
116. Id. ¶ 7. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. ¶ 8. 
119. Id. (noting that the signed form was actually found on the ground after Roberts was injured). 
120. Id. ¶ 10. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. ¶ 13.  As the court noted,  
[t]he evidence submitted to the circuit court demonstrated that defendant Kerry 
Hanson, the balloon operator, had limited experience with tethered ballooning 
before giving rides at Green Valley’s event.  Hanson testified in his deposition 
that he should have obtained information regarding weather fronts in the area.  
Had he known about the weather front on the day Roberts was injured, Hanson 
testified that he would have suspended the ride.   
Id. ¶ 11. 
123. Id. ¶ 57. 
124. Id. 
125. See id. ¶ 63. 
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In reaching its conclusion, the Wisconsin Supreme Court examined its 
previous rulings in Richards, Yauger, and Atkins.126  Again, the court stated, 
“[i]f the contract covers the activity, we proceed to a public policy analysis, 
‘which remains the “germane analysis” for exculpatory clauses.’”127  Moving 
to public policy, the court noted that the Atkins decision adopted a combination 
of the factors set forth in both Yauger and Richards.128  Again, the factors set 
forth in Atkins included whether: “(1) the waiver was overly broad and all-
inclusive; (2) the form served two functions and did not provide the signer 
adequate notification of the waiver’s nature and significance; and (3) there was 
little or no opportunity to bargain or negotiate in regard to the exculpatory 
language in question.”129  This time around, the court reached its conclusion 
based on the first and third factors.130   
First, the exculpatory contract was overly broad and all-inclusive.131  In 
finding that the exculpatory contract was overly broad and all-inclusive, the 
court examined the following specific provisions: 
I expressly, willing, and voluntarily assume full 
responsibility for all risks of any and every kind involved with 
or arising from my participation in hot air balloon activities 
with Company whether during flight preparation, take-off, 
flight, landing, travel to or from the take-off or landing areas, 
or otherwise. 
Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, I hereby 
irrevocably release Company, its employees, agents, 
representatives, contractors, subcontractors, successors, heirs, 
assigns, affiliates, and legal representatives (the “Released 
Parties”) from, and hold them harmless for, all claims, rights, 
demands or causes of action whether known or unknown, 
suspected or unsuspected, arising out of the ballooning 
activities.132   
 
126. Id. ¶¶ 50–55.  “Our prior decisions have also set forth the factors to apply in analyzing 
whether a contract is void as a matter of law.”  Id. ¶ 50. 
127. Id. ¶ 49 (quoting Atkins v. Swimwest Family Fitness Ctr., 2005 WI 4, ¶ 13, 277 Wis. 2d 
303, 691 N.W.2d 334 (citing Yauger v. Skiing Enters., Inc., 206 Wis. 2d 76, 86, 557 N.W.2d 60, 64 
(1996))). 
128. Id. ¶ 55. 
129. Id. 
130. See id. ¶¶ 59–63. 
131. Id. ¶ 59. 
132. Id. ¶ 9. 
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Additionally, the court addressed the issue of whether Roberts would have 
contemplated that the waiver covered waiting in line for a balloon ride.133   
Second, Mrs. Roberts had no opportunity to bargain or negotiate,134 given 
the fact that she was told, in order to ride the hot air balloon, she must sign the 
form.135  Moreover, the court noted that Sundog did not discuss with Roberts: 
the content of the waiver; any risk associated with the activity of riding hot air 
balloons; or any risks of watching others ride hot air balloons.136  Additionally, 
Sundog did not ask if Roberts had any complaints or concerns regarding the 
waiver, and therefore, she was given no opportunity to bargain or negotiate the 
terms laid out.137 
As seen in Roberts, rather than clarifying Wisconsin’s law regarding the 
enforceability of exculpatory contracts—as had been requested by the court of 
appeals in Atkins138—the Wisconsin Supreme Court has continued to void 
exculpatory contracts.139  Furthermore, the court has tailored its analysis to fit 
within each case, and has applied different factors to each.140  This type of 
analysis exemplifies just how difficult it is for businesses to prevail when 
relying on an exculpatory contract.   
B. The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s Hypothetical Analysis of the 
Exculpatory  Language Found in a Milwaukee Gym Membership 
Agreement 
When the New Year hits, millions of people across America begin to make 
New Year’s resolutions.  For many Americans, that resolution often entails 
shedding some unwanted pounds.  As a result, consumers will flock to their 
local gym eager to achieve their New Year’s goal.141  Nevertheless, before one 
 
133. Id. ¶ 60 (“[I]t is not clear whether waiting in line for the ride is something Roberts would 
have contemplated as being covered by the waiver, especially because she was not required to return 
the waiver before she got into the line.”).  
134. Id. ¶ 61. 
135. Id. ¶ 62 (“Roberts was told she would have to sign ‘this document.’” (emphasis added)). 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
138. Atkins v. Swimwest Family Fitness Ctr., 2005 WI 4, ¶ 10, 277 Wis. 2d 303, 691 N.W.2d 
334.  
139. See, e.g., Roberts, 2016 WI 20, ¶ 63. 
140. Compare id. at ¶¶ 59–63, with Atkins, 2005 WI 4, ¶¶ 18–19, and Yauger v. Skiing Enters., 
Inc., 206 Wis. 2d 76, 78, 557 N.W.2d 60, 61 (1996), and Richards v. Richards, 181 Wis. 2d 1007, 
1016, 513 N.W.2d 118, 122 (1994). 
141. Oliver St. John, Can Gyms Retain New Year’s Resolution Members?, USA TODAY (Jan. 
16, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/2013/01/16/gyms-new-years-
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may dive into his or her new workout routine, many gyms require consumers 
to fill out gym membership contracts.142  However, given the status of 
Wisconsin’s current law regarding exculpatory contracts, recreational business 
owners, specifically gym owners (for purposes of this Section), cannot safely 
rely upon exculpatory language or release waivers in order to avoid liability.143  
Using the analysis undertaken in Roberts, in this Section I examine a 
Milwaukee gym membership contract,144 and evaluate whether or not a 
Wisconsin court would find the exculpatory language in the contract 
enforceable.  In order to create a hypothetical lawsuit, I take facts from a recent 
case heard by California’s Court of Appeal.145 
In this “hypothetical” case, a gym member fell backwards off of a moving 
treadmill and hit her head on the steel foot of an exercise machine,146 and, as a 
result of the fall, sustained severe head injuries.147  The machine upon which 
the member hit her head was placed nearly four feet behind the treadmill.148  
Consequently, the gym member filed a lawsuit claiming the gym was negligent 
in its set up of the treadmill.149  The gym maintains it is free from liability 
because the member had signed a waiver of liability form.150  In response, the 
member argues that the waiver should be found unenforceable because it 
violates public policy.151 
 
resolution-rush/1779651/ [https://perma.cc/9FS8-RLRP] (citing a survey that found “over 12% of new 
gym members join in January alone”). 
142. See, e.g., Gold’s Gym Membership Agreement (Jan. 12, 2017) [hereinafter Milwaukee 
Gym Membership Agreement] (on file with author); FTX Crossfit Membership Agreement, FTX 
CROSSFIT, http://ftxcrossfit.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/FTXMembershipAgreement1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J3R3-58U5] (last visited Jan. 3, 2018); Life Gym, L.L.C. Membership Agreement, 
LIFE GYM, https://www.lifegymok.com/files/Revised%20Life%20Gym%20Membership.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z23A-RF2Q] (last visited Jan. 3, 2018). 
143. See generally Bruett, supra note 2 (addressing the issue of whether a reasonable business 
can safely rely upon exculpatory contracts to limit liability).  
144. Milwaukee Gym Membership Agreement, supra note 142. 
145. Jimenez v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 228 (Ct. App. 2015).  
146. Id. at 231. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. at 231–32 (noting that the treadmill’s owner’s manual states that “[t]he minimum space 
requirement needed for user safety and proper maintenance is three feet wide by six feet 
deep . . . directly behind the running belt”). 
150. Id. at 231. 
151. In Jiminez itself, the plaintiff actually argued that the release was “invalid because [the gym] 
was grossly negligent and because [the gym] obtained the release through fraud.”  Id. at 233.  
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Applying the framework in Roberts, the court would first determine 
whether the language of the contract covered the activity.152  Because the 
language in the contract does cover the activity,153 the court would then proceed 
to the germane analysis for exculpatory contracts—public policy.154  Case law 
has detailed factors to apply when analyzing whether a contract is void as 
against public policy.155  Similar to Roberts, the court here would likely find 
the waiver of liability void as against public policy “because it fails to satisfy 
the factors set forth in [its] prior case law.”156  Specifically, the court would 
examine two factors.   
First, the gym’s liability waiver is likely too broad and all-inclusive.157  As 
mentioned previously, “[a]n exculpatory agreement will be held to contravene 
public policy if it is so broad ‘that it would absolve [the defendant] from any 
injury to the [plaintiff] for any reason.’”158  Analogous to Roberts, the waiver 
of liability here would “absolve [the Milwaukee gym] . . . for any reason.”159  
The waiver states:   
Member voluntarily agrees to assume all risks of personal 
injury to Member, Member’s spouse, children, unborn 
children, other family members, guests or invitees and waives 
any and all claims or actions Member may have against [the 
Gym], any of its subsidiaries or other affiliates and any of their 
respective officers, directors, employees, agents, successors 
and assigns for any such personal injury (and no such person 
shall be liable to Member, Member’s spouse, children, unborn 
children, other family members, guests or invitees for any such 
personal injury), including, without limitation [injuries that 
 
152. See Roberts v. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 2016 WI 20, ¶ 49, 367 Wis. 2d 386, 879 N.W.2d 492. 
153. See Milwaukee Gym Membership Agreement, supra note 142 (“Member voluntarily agrees 
to assume all risks of personal injury to Member . . . and waives any and all claims or actions that 
Member may have against [this] Gym . . . for any such personal injury . . . including, without 
limitation . . . injuries arising from use of any exercise equipment.”). 
154. See Roberts, 2016 WI 20, ¶ 49. 
155. See id. ¶ 50.  Factors the court will consider include: (1) whether the waiver is overly broad 
and all-inclusive; (2) whether the form serves two functions and does not provide the signer adequate 
notification of the waiver’s nature and significance; and (3) whether there is little or no opportunity to 
bargain or negotiate in regard to the exculpatory language in question.  See, e.g., Richards v. Richards, 
181 Wis. 2d 1007, 1017–19, 513 N.W.2d 118, 122–23 (1994). 
156. Roberts, 2016 WI 20, ¶ 58. 
157. See Milwaukee Gym Membership Agreement, supra note 142. 
158. Richards, 181 Wis. 2d at 1015 (alterations in original) (quoting Coll. Mobile Home Park & 
Sales, Inc. v. Hoffmann, 72 Wis. 2d 514, 521–22, 241 N.W.2d 174, 178 (1976)). 
159. Roberts, 2016 WI 20, ¶ 60. 
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result from various types of gym activities].160 
Second, the form serves two functions and is not clearly identified.  The 
form functions as the Membership Agreement as well as the Waiver of Liability 
form.161  This dual function was not clearly identified in the title,162 as the title 
of the form states “Membership Agreement.”  The only sort of notice offered is 
a statement near the bottom of the form which reads, “Notice: See other side 
for important information.”163  A court would not likely give this fact much 
significance.  Throughout the first page of the Membership Agreement, the 
member is required to initial or sign next to sections regarding items such as 
monthly dues and consent to receive telemarketing calls and texts.164  
Nonetheless, the member is not required to initial or sign next to the Waiver of 
Liability section.165  Thus, the Membership Agreement fails to clearly 
distinguish between the dual functions.   
The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s analysis in Roberts, as well as its 
application to a given set of facts, as illustrated above, demonstrates just how 
difficult it is for businesses to prevail when relying on an exculpatory contract.  
Additionally, the court’s eventual adoption of public policy as the germane 
analysis underscores the court’s broad discretion when resolving the 
enforceability of exculpatory contracts.166  This near impossibility to find an 
enforceable exculpatory contract has left scholars and practicing attorneys 
begging the question whether a business can safely rely upon exculpatory 
contracts.167 
 
160. Milwaukee Gym Membership Agreement, supra note 142 (emphasis added). 
161. See id. 
162. See Richards, 181 Wis. 2d at 1017, for an analysis of this requirement.  In Richards, the 
form was titled “Passenger Authorization,” yet functioned as both (1) an authorization form to allow 
passengers to ride in a company vehicle and (2) a release of liability form.  Id. 
163. Milwaukee Gym Membership Agreement, supra note 142. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. 
166. See, e.g., Roberts v. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 2016 WI 20, ¶ 49, 367 Wis. 2d 386, 879 N.W.2d 492; 
Atkins v. Swimwest Family Fitness Ctr., 2005 WI 4, ¶ 13, 277 Wis. 2d 303, 691 N.W.2d 334; Yauger 
v. Skiing Enters., Inc., 206 Wis. 2d 76, 86, 557 N.W.2d 60, 64 (1996).  
167. See Timothy Fenner, Waivers of Liability: Are They Worth the Paper They Are Written 
On?, AXLEY BRYNELSON (May 30, 2013), https://www.axley.com/publication_article/waivers-of-
liability-are-they-worth-the-paper-they-are-written-on/ [https://perma.cc/AVL4-UYFS]; Schuster, Do 
Liability Waivers Really Work?, supra note 92; Richard Schuster, The Wisconsin Supreme Court 
Weighs in Again on Liability Waivers, MATTHIESEN, WICKERT & LEHRER, S.C.: BLOG (Oct. 25, 2016), 
https://www.mwl-law.com/wisconsin-supreme-court-weighs-liability-waivers/ 
[https://perma.cc/R4BT-BXQZ]; see also Bruett, supra note 2, at 1098 (“[U]nder the current approach 
taken by Wisconsin courts, businesses cannot safely rely upon these agreements.”). 
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IV. STATUTORY PROTECTION   
While the Wisconsin Supreme Court has yet to uphold an exculpatory 
contract since 1982,168 the ski industry can breathe a sigh of relief.  On February 
29, 2016, the Wisconsin Legislature enacted Wisconsin Act 168.169  The 
purpose of the act was to repeal, amend, renumber, and create statutes170 related 
to the “duties of ski area operators and persons who bike in a ski area, and 
liability of ski area operators.”171  In this Part, I examine this Act more closely, 
demonstrating that ski resorts no longer have a need for exculpatory contracts.  
Additionally, I run a quick survey of various ski resorts, which will verify 
whether these ski resorts are taking advantage of the statutory protection.  
Finally, I briefly return to the case Roberts v. T.H.E. Insurance Company, which 
will demonstrate the court’s willingness to grant statutory protection when 
applicable, and thus, eliminate the need for customers to sign exculpatory 
contracts.   
A. Wisconsin Statutes Section 167.33—Alpine Sports 
Wisconsin Statutes sections 167.33(3) and 167.33(4) impose certain duties 
upon ski area operators and ski area owners.172  Under section 167.33(3)(a), the 
first duty imposed upon a ski area operator is to print a warning notice on each 
ticket issued to participants.173  Sections 167.33(3)(b) through 167.33(3)(j) lay 
out various requirements concerning signage.174  These requirements specify: 
(1) the exact language of what each sign should contain; (2) the dimensions of 
the signs; and (3) the location(s) of where the signs need to be placed.175  
 
168. See Pendleton, supra note 9, at 17; see also Roberts v. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 2016 WI 20, 367 
Wis. 2d 386, 879 N.W.2d 492.  
169. 2015 Wis. Act 168. 
170. Id.  
171. Id. 
172. WIS. STAT. §§ 167.33(3)–(4) (2015–2016).  
173. Id. § 167.33(3)(a) (“WARNING: Under Wisconsin law, each participant in an alpine sport 
assumes the risk of injury or death to person or injury to property resulting from the conditions and 
risks that are considered to be inherent in an alpine sport, has a number of duties that must be met while 
engaging in an alpine sport, and is subject to limitations on the ability to recover damages from a ski 
area operator for injuries or death to a person or to property.  A complete copy of this law is available 
for review at the main site where tickets to this ski area are sold.”). 
174. See id. §§ 167.33(3)–(j). 
175. Id. § 167.33(3)(b).  This section states, in part: 
Each ski area operator shall post and maintain the following signs: 
1. A sign that is at least 10 square feet in size at or near each of the sites where 
tickets to the ski area are sold, at or near each of the entrances or lift loading areas 
for areas that are open to alpine sports, and at or near each area open to sledding, 
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Moreover, Wisconsin Statutes section 167.33(4) sets out other various duties 
for ski owners.176  Specifically, section 167.33(4)(c) requires a qualified lift 
inspector177 to perform annual lift inspections.178 
The substance of Wisconsin Act 168, however, is the amendment to 
Wisconsin Statutes section 895.526(4)(a).  This section states: 
A ski operator who fulfills all of his or her duties under 
[subsections] 167.33 (3) and (4) owes no further duty of care 
to a participant in an alpine sport and is not liable for an injury 
or death that occurs as a result of any condition or risk accepted 
by the participant under [subsection] (2).179   
This statute finally provides a means to escape exculpatory contracts, yet a 
foolproof mechanism to ensure protection from liability.  Now, think back to 
Dobratz v. Thomson.180  In that case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated:  
[A]lthough we do not intend to create a “magic words” rule, 
we consider that it would be very helpful for such contracts to 
set forth in clear and express terms that the party signing it is 
releasing others for their negligent acts or, where the contract 
includes an assumption of risk clause, is assuming the risk of 
 
biking, or tubing which is not served by a lift.  The sign shall contain the following 
warning: 
WARNING—ASSUMPTION OF RISKS: Under Wisconsin law, each 
participant in an alpine sport is considered to have accepted and to have 
knowledge of the risk of injury or death to person or injury to property that may 
result.  Under Wisconsin law, each participant in an alpine sport has the duty to 
take the precautions that are necessary to avoid injury or death to person or injury 
to property.  Wisconsin law sets forth certain other limitations on the liability of 
ski area operators for injuries or death to person or injury to property.  A complete 
copy of this law is available for review at the main site where tickets to this ski 
area are sold. 
Id.   
176. See id. § 167.33(4). 
177. Under section 167.33(4)(d), a qualified lift inspector means: 
1. An individual authorized by the department of safety and professional 
services to make inspections of lifts pursuant to ch. 101. 
2. An individual who has knowledge of the requirements of the rules specified 
in par. (c) and of the design and operation of lifts and who has one of the 
following: 
a. A degree of engineering from a recognized university. 
b. Experience as an inspector of lifts for an insurance company that has 
provided liability insurance coverage to any ski area. 
Id. § 167.33(4)(d). 
178. Id. § 167.33(4)(c). 
179. Id. § 895.526(4)(a). 
180. 161 Wis. 2d 502, 468 N.W.2d 654 (1991). 
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harm caused by the negligent acts of others.181   
For years the Wisconsin Supreme Court has evolved its analysis regarding 
exculpatory contracts, yet has failed to offer any sort of concrete guidance on 
how to draft an enforceable agreement.182  However, with the enactment of 
Wisconsin Act 168, the legislature has created those “magic words,” and as a 
result, ski resorts essentially have a checklist,183 fulfillment of which enables 
them to escape liability, and thus, eliminates the need for its participants to sign 
an exculpatory agreement.   
B. Survey: Are Wisconsin Ski Resorts Still Using Release Forms? 
This nonexhaustive survey is intended to reveal whether ski resorts in 
Wisconsin have moved away from the no-longer-needed release agreements 
per Wisconsin Statutes section 895.526(4)(a).  After examining three different 
ski resorts, I found that only one resort has completely abandoned exculpatory 
agreements.  Both Granite Peak184 and Grand Geneva185 still require 
participants to fill out release of liability forms.  On the other hand, Alpine 
Valley Resort no longer requires participants to fill out a release of liability 
form.186   
While this may seem surprising or even somewhat discouraging, one should 
keep a few things in perspective.  Wisconsin Act 168 was enacted February 29, 
2016 and the effective date was March 2, 2016.187  Accordingly, as of the time 
of this publication, the statutory amendments have not even been in place for 
two years.  More importantly, a possible reason these resorts still “rely” on the 
 
181. Id. at 525 (emphasis added). 
182. See, e.g., Roberts v. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 2016 WI 20, 367 Wis. 2d 386, 879 N.W.2d 492; Atkins 
v. Swimwest Family Fitness Ctr., 2005 WI 4, 277 Wis. 2d 303, 691 N.W.2d 334; Yauger v. Skiing 
Enters., Inc., 206 Wis. 2d 76, 557 N.W.2d 60 (1996); Richards v. Richards, 181 Wis. 2d 1007, 513 
N.W.2d 118 (1994); Dobratz, 161 Wis. 2d at 502; Disc. Fabric House of Racine, Inc. v. Wis. Tel. Co., 
117 Wis. 2d 587, 345 N.W.2d 417 (1984); Arnold v. Shawano Cty. Agric. Socʹy, 111 Wis. 2d 203, 330 
N.W.2d 773 (1983), overruled on other grounds by Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 
401 N.W.2d 816 (1987); Merten v. Nathan, 108 Wis. 2d 205, 321 N.W.2d 173 (1982). 
183. See generally 2015 Wis. Act 168. 
184. Releases and Waivers, GRANITE PEAK, 
https://www.skigranitepeak.com/contactUs/releasesWaivers.cfm [https://perma.cc/4G8C-ZMLC] 
(last visited Sept. 29, 2017).  
185. Release of Liability: Ski, GRAND GENEVA, http://www.grandgeneva.com/pdf-lake-geneva-
vacation/documents/release_of_liability.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MRF-C4YK] (last visited Sept. 29, 
2017). 
186. See Documents/Forms, ALPINE VALLEY RESORT, http://www.alpinevalleyresort.com/the-
resort/documents/ [https://perma.cc/YP2D-XBMQ] (last visited Sept. 29, 2017). 
187. 2015 Wis. Act 168. 
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use of exculpatory agreements is to keep insurance premiums down.188  In 
return, the ski resort is able to offer rental tickets and equipment at a reduced 
price.189  Whatever the case may be, as evidenced by Alpine Valley Resort, the 
ski industry seems to be moving away from exculpatory contracts and relying 
on the statutory protection.   
C. Wisconsin Statutes Section 895.52—Recreational Activities; Limitation of 
Property  Owners’ Liability 
Before the court in Roberts resolved the issue concerning the waiver of 
liability form, the court answered the question of whether or not Sundog was 
entitled to immunity under Wisconsin Statutes section 895.52.190  This 
recreational immunity statute protects property owners from potential liability 
when they open their lands to the public.191  In Roberts, Sundog argued that 
section 895.52 was applicable, and as a result, should have been entitled to 
immunity.192   
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, held that Sundog was not entitled 
to the recreational immunity under the statute because “Sundog . . . [was] not 
an owner under the statute . . . and the hot air balloon was not ‘property’ because 
 
188. See, e.g., Disc. Fabric House of Racine, Inc. v. Wis. Tel. Co., 117 Wis. 2d 587, 599–600, 
345 N.W.2d 417, 423 (1984) (“This exculpatory clause may have kept the company’s insurance 
premiums down.”). 
189. See Bruett, supra note 2, at 1081. 
190. Roberts v. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 2016 WI 20, ¶ 47, 367 Wis. 2d 386, 879 N.W.2d 492.  If the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court did in fact find that Sundog was entitled to the recreational immunity under 
section 895.52, the court would not have even addressed the waiver of liability form at issue. 
191. Id. ¶ 28; see also WIS. STAT. § 895.52 (2015–2016).  Section 895.52(2) states: 
(2) NO DUTY; IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY. 
(a) Except as provided in [subsections] (3) to (6), no owner and no officer, 
employee or agent of an owner owes to any person who enters the owner’s 
property to engage in a recreational activity: 
1. A duty to keep the property safe for recreational activities. 
2. A duty to inspect the property, except as provided under [section] 
23.115(2). 
3. A duty to give warning of an unsafe condition, use or activity on the 
property. 
(b) Except as provided in [subsections] (3) to (6), no owner and no officer, 
employee or agent of an owner is liable for the death of, any injury to, or any 
death or injury caused by, a person engaging in a recreational activity on the 
owner’s property. 
Id. § 895.52(2)(a)–(b). 
192. Roberts, 2016 WI 20, ¶ 29. 
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it [was] not a ‘structure.’”193  While the court in Roberts did not grant 
recreational immunity to Sundog, the court did cite to cases in which the 
defendant was entitled to immunity under section 895.52.194  This suggests the 
court’s willingness to grant statutory protection when applicable.  Thus, had 
Sundog been protected under the statute, the need for Patti Roberts to sign the 
waiver of liability form would have been eliminated.   
V. A STATUTE IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION: THE SOLUTION 
Nearly nineteen years ago, a Marquette Law School student, Keith Bruett, 
wrote a comment questioning whether businesses could safely rely upon 
exculpatory contracts to limit their liability.195  Well, fast-forward to present 
day, and you will find that the Wisconsin Supreme Court has made it nearly 
impossible to draft an enforceable exculpatory contract, causing many 
Wisconsin-practicing attorneys to ask the same question.196  So, if Wisconsin 
businesses cannot safely rely upon exculpatory contracts to limit their liability, 
what is the solution? 
In that same article written nineteen years ago, Bruett suggested that the 
best solution lies in the hands of the legislature.197  He proposed two different 
options, both of which called for legislative action: (1) completely ban the use 
of exculpatory contracts or (2) codify the requirements for the use of 
exculpatory contracts.198  Of the two options, Bruett seemed to favor the 
codification of requirements when drafting an exculpatory contract.199  
However, as he correctly noted, codifying requirements regarding exculpatory 
contracts “would not preclude a reviewing court from invalidating an 
exculpatory agreement that contravenes public policy.”200 
 
193. Id. ¶ 46.  Under section 895.52, owner means “[a] person, including a governmental body 
or nonprofit organization, that owns, leases or occupies property.”  WIS. STAT. § 895.52(1)(d). 
194. Roberts, 2016 WI 20, ¶¶ 28–32; see, e.g., Hall v. Turtle Lake Lions Club, 146 Wis. 2d 486, 
487, 431 N.W.2d 696, 697 (Ct. App. 1988); Weina v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 179 Wis. 2d 774, 776, 508 
N.W.2d 67, 68 (Ct. App. 1993). 
195. Bruett, supra note 2. 
196. See Fenner, supra note 167; see also Schuster, Do Liability Waivers Really Work?, supra 
note 92. 
197. Bruett, supra note 2, at 1098. 
198. Id. at 1098–99. 
199. Id. (“While [prohibiting the use of exculpatory contracts] would provide certainty, the cost 
to businesses would be greater liability exposure and higher insurance premiums.  Rather than bear 
these costs, businesses would likely pass these costs onto the consumer [which] may nevertheless 
adversely affect businesses if escalating costs kept patrons away.”). 
200. Id. at 1099. 
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While I too believe legislative action is the correct solution, the best 
approach is to follow the blueprint already created by the legislature, such as 
the blueprint found in sections 167.33 and 895.526(4)(a).201  This approach 
eliminates the need for exculpatory contracts, all the while affording 
recreational businesses the necessary protection.202  This solution takes an 
already highly regulated recreational business, like snow skiing,203 and codifies 
safety requirements.204  If the recreational business satisfies all the requirements 
within the statute, then the business owes no further duty to its customers.  As 
a result, the statute eliminates the need to use exculpatory contracts.   
Moreover, codifying safety requirements for recreational businesses, and 
thus, eliminating the need for exculpatory contracts, also eradicates the broad 
discretion used by the Wisconsin Supreme Court when analyzing an 
exculpatory contract under public policy grounds.  Under this proposal, when a 
party brings a negligence claim against a recreational business, the court’s 
analysis will now consist of checking whether the business has satisfied all the 
requirements set out in the statute.  If the business fails to satisfy all the statutory 
requirements, and as a result the consumer is injured, the court will hold the 
recreational business liable for such injuries.  However, if the business has 
satisfied all the statutory requirements, the recreational business will be 
afforded the liability protection under the statute. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Given the current status of Wisconsin’s law regarding exculpatory 
contracts, recreational businesses cannot safely rely upon exculpatory language 
or release waivers in order to limit liability.  The court’s ability to use broad 
discretion under the public policy analysis has led to the consistent holding: 
void as against public policy.205  Codifying safety requirements for recreational 
 
201. See WIS. STAT. §§ 167.33(3)–(4), 895.526 (2015–2016). 
202. See generally id. 
203. See generally Safety Programs, NATIONAL SKI AREA ASSOCIATION, 
http://www.nsaa.org/safety-programs/ [https://perma.cc/5MJL-6588] (last visited Jan. 9, 2018); NSAA 
Ski Lift Safety Fact Sheet, NATIONAL SKI AREA ASSOCIATION, 
http://www.nsaa.org/media/310500/Lift_Safety_Fact_Sheet_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/2754-
3WM6] (last visited Jan. 9, 2018). 
204. See WIS. STAT. §§ 167.33(3)–(4), 895.526(4). 
205. See, e.g., Roberts v. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 2016 WI 20, 367 Wis. 2d 386, 879 N.W.2d 492; Atkins 
v. Swimwest Family Fitness Ctr., 2005 WI 4, 277 Wis. 2d 303, 691 N.W.2d 334; Yauger v. Skiing 
Enters., Inc., 206 Wis. 2d 76, 557 N.W.2d 60 (1996); Richards v. Richards, 181 Wis. 2d 1007, 513 
N.W.2d 118 (1994); Disc. Fabric House of Racine, Inc. v. Wis. Tel. Co., 117 Wis. 2d 587, 345 N.W.2d 
417 (1984); Merten v. Nathan, 108 Wis. 2d 205, 321 N.W.2d 173 (1982).  
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businesses will eliminate the court’s broad discretion.  Additionally, those 
recreational businesses that abide by the applicable requirements will be 
afforded statutory protection against potential liability.  Moreover, the new 
statutory requirements will strive to ensure safety to those consumers who 
choose to participate in the recreational activity. 
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